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Abstract: In the last four decades, the Dutch drinking water industry has undergone two major policy
reforms, namely the consolidation of the industry by stimulating mergers and the introduction of
yardstick competition by applying benchmarks. This paper addresses the question of whether these
two instruments have improved productivity. Productivity changes are derived from an estimated
cost function. The effects of average scale as well as the introduction of a form of yardstick competition
on productivity are formally tested. Estimation is conducted on the basis of time series data in the
period 1980–2015. Industry consolidation has taken place over a long period of time. Yardstick
competition was introduced in 1997 on a voluntary basis. It shows that total factor productivity was
rather stable in the period 1980–1998. Since 1998, annual productivity growth has been substantial
(about 0.6% on average). There was an obvious break point in 1998, providing clear evidence that
the introduction of the benchmark instrument has affected productivity change. Moreover, there are
various indications that benchmarking has also contributed to improving quality and sustainability.
We could not find any empirical evidence for the hypothesis that consolidation of the industry has
improved productivity.
Keywords: drinking water; policy reforms; benchmarking; scale economies; cost model; productivity
change; time series
JEL Classification: C33; D24; L95
1. Introduction
Over the past 35 years, the public sector has undergone major changes. This can mainly be
attributed to the liberalisation policy that was implemented in most Western countries in the 1980s.
Under the influence of the economic crisis, the emergence of market thinking and the new public
management philosophy, in which an increase in the productivity and efficacy of the public sector
took central place, the aim of the policy was to reduce the role of government in society. Remote
administration, the reduction and simplification of rules, greater autonomy for public and semi-public
organisations, the consolidation of organisations and, where possible, the introduction of market forces
and privatisation were the main contributions of the liberalisation policy.
This policy focused primarily on the network sectors, such as the energy sector, the railways and
the drinking water sector, which at the time were referred to as the utility sectors due to the overall
usefulness of the goods and services provided by the companies in these sectors. Apart from their
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provision of utility services, these network sectors also differ from other economic sectors due to their
considerable external impacts on the environment, public health and safety, and the fact that goods or
services are delivered by means of a permanent physical infrastructure. A related issue is the fact that
the network sectors are also characterised by high sunk costs and economies of scale in production,
which means that duplication of a network is socially inefficient, thus bringing about a monopolistic
situation. In the past, these characteristics were important reasons for putting the production of goods
and services in the hands of the government. The aim of the liberalisation policy was to return some of
this control to the market. Improving efficiency was by far the most important goal of this policy. As a
result, the prices of products and services would fall, whilst simultaneously improving their quality [1].
In order to realise this efficiency-enhancing policy, the government has a number of instruments
at its disposal. They vary from changes in funding, consolidation of organisations, organisational
improvements, downsizing bureaucratic procedures and protocols, and introducing forms of new
public management (yardstick competition, extending accountability). These policy instruments can be
subdivided into four categories, coinciding with four basic control options to influence the behaviour
of the actors involved: funding, ownership, market organisation and external instruments [1]. The
last-mentioned refers to instruments that affect demand-side behaviour. Policymakers in the drinking
water industry have primarily focused on two types of market organisation reform: consolidation of the
industry by stimulating mergers and the introduction of yardstick competition by applying benchmarks.
The question we ask here is whether these two instruments have improved productivity. It is
therefore important to have an insight into productivity change and how productivity change can be
influenced. Therefore, the following two research questions can be derived:
1. What is the productivity change in the drinking water sector in the past four decades?
2. Has productivity change been influenced by government policy, in particular by industry
consolidation and yardstick competition?
We answer these two questions by presenting a historical analysis of the productivity change of
the drinking water sector in the Netherlands. Using an econometric time series analysis of inputs and
outputs of the drinking water sector, sector productivity is estimated for the period 1980–2016. The
observed productivity development is then linked to the two policy reforms that took place during
that period. Whereas consolidation was imposed over a long period—namely between 1980 and
2005—yardstick competition was introduced in 1999 on a voluntary basis and made mandatory through
legislation in 2011. We test the hypotheses that economies of scale exist and that the drinking water
industry under yardstick competition performs better than it did in the period before the introduction
of yardstick competition. In other words, we test whether the average productivity of the drinking
water sector in different periods of time differs, and whether these differences are related to the main
policy reforms in those periods of time.
2. Literature
To improve public sector performance, governments around the globe have tried a wide
range of management reforms, such as the contracting out of services and the privatisation of
organisations, and with respect to public service delivery, obligatory benchmarking to create a
simulated competitive market environment [2]. Benchmarking is a management instrument for
comparing the performance of organisations that originate from the private sector [3]. Since the
rise of the ‘new public management’ [4], public organisations are often managed in a business-like
manner; consequently, the use of benchmarking in the public sector has increased. Blank et al. [5] and
Andersen et al. [6] claim that nowadays performance is possibly the most important concept in public
administration and the improvement of public services; the productivity of public organisations and
the quality of their services are considered as the central responsibilities of government [7].
Performance measurement is the process of quantifying the effectiveness and efficiency of
actions [8]. Neely et al. [9] define a performance measurement system as a set of measures used
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to quantify the effectiveness and efficiency of these actions. They explain that from a corporative
perspective, effectiveness is understood as the level of service achieved in relation to consumer needs,
while efficiency refers to the economic use of company resources to provide consumers with a certain
level of satisfaction. Linking performance measurement to benchmarking Andersen and Fagerhaug [10]
assert that the benchmarking has several main objectives, namely to support decision making, to
change behaviour and increase motivation, to monitor performance trends, to state priority and actions,
to verify the effectiveness of optimisation measures already implemented, to aid the dissemination of
organisational results via marketing, and to aid benchmarking processes.
Benchmarking is seen as a powerful instrument for quality improvement in the public sector [11],
but not only for quality improvement. Benchmarking in the public and the private sector is a similar
process, although the objectives may be slightly different [2]. Benchmarking in the public sector,
for instance, is not only focused on productivity improvement; rather, it is presented as a tool for
collaborative learning among public sector organisations to promote organisational learning and
to enhance transparency [12]. Transparency is crucial for government control of public services,
while the benchmark in itself creates a kind of managed competition, which may lead to quality
improvement [13,14].
Zairi and Leonard [15] already expressed that performance measurement, if only internally
focused, may have great limitations because it could be considered as focusing on effectiveness rather
than competitiveness. Benchmarking, in contrast, ensures that performance establishes competitiveness
and best practice through doing the right things right in the eyes of the end customer. Best practice
in efficiency is particularly important in that respect. In many countries, increasing efficiency was
therefore an important motive for introducing benchmarking into public sectors, including the drinking
water sector.
In recent decades, a large number of studies have been carried out into the efficiency of drinking
water services. An overview of this can be found in different articles [16–18]. These and various other
studies suggest that benchmarking often has a positive effect on the efficiency of the drinking water
industry. The Dutch drinking water sector is commonly cited as having one of the best practices in
that regard. The Dutch benchmarking scheme is one of the oldest in Europe and several studies have
shown that since the introduction of the Dutch benchmarking scheme at the end of the 1990s, the
performance of the drinking water companies has steadily increased [19]. Dijkgraaf et al. [20] estimate
the total efficiency gain in the period 1997–2002 at around 8–12%. Schmitz and Dane [21] claim a 23%
efficiency improvement in the period 1997–2006. Other studies also show a strong increase in efficiency
following the introduction of the benchmark [1,22].
The Dutch drinking water sector also performs well in comparison with the drinking water sector
in other countries. De Witte and Marques [23], for example, calculate from 2004 data that the Dutch
drinking water industry operates more efficiently than the privatised English/Welsh sectors, the strict
regulatory industry of Australia, and the municipal provision companies in Belgium and Portugal.
Although most studies assume that the Dutch efficiency gain is due to the introduction of the
benchmark scheme, other factors may have influenced this. In particular, the industry consolidation
may be considered in that respect. As discussed in the introduction, from 1980 onwards, Dutch
policy with regard to the drinking water sector put a lot of emphasis on stimulating consolidation by
encouraging mergers. Over the decades, this policy has resulted in a huge reduction in the number
of drinking water companies and a proportional growth in the size of the remaining ones. The
consolidation policy was largely motivated by the idea that operating at a larger scale increases the
efficiency due to economies of scale. However, hard evidence for these benefits is lacking. Many
studies have been conducted to assess the effects of scale on the efficiency of drinking water provision;
see for instance the overviews given by different authors [17,24–27]. These overviews show that
there is little empirical evidence on the efficiency impact of mergers in the drinking water industry.
De Witte and Dijkgraaf [28] study the effects of mergers in the Dutch drinking water sector and
come to the same conclusion. They note that although very small companies enjoy scale economies,
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larger utilities are not producing at lower cost. In their paper, they point in particular to the absence
of the two underlying mechanisms of merger economies, namely scale economies and increased
incentives to combat inefficiencies. As a result, only a negative efficiency effect of mergers remains:
there are fewer opportunities for an effective benchmark. For an effective benchmarking, a minimum
number of companies is required. A smaller number of companies potentially decreases the power of
benchmarking; as a result, the efficiency gains will also decrease.
From the above studies it can be concluded that consolidation does not seem to be the decisive
factor contributing to the efficiency of the drinking water sector. Benchmarking may be of greater
significance, as the developments in the Dutch drinking water sector seem to show [29]. In this article,
we examine whether this is true.
3. Policy Reforms in the Dutch Drinking Water Supply Sector
The production and supply of drinking water in the Netherlands is currently handled by 10 drinking
water companies, each with its own geographical supply area. The drinking water organisations are
public limited companies whose shareholders are public parties, that is, municipalities and provinces.
The companies are managed by a board of directors and are supervised by a non-executive board, an
independent accountant and the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate, which is part of the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management.
The current number of drinking water companies is only one tenth of the number of companies
that were active at the start of the research period. This is the result of the policy that has been
pursued in recent decades. As discussed, from 1980 onwards, Dutch policy encouraged mergers in
the drinking water sector. This policy had already been implemented in previous decades, but had
had insufficient effect, according to the Dutch government. To change that, and be able to meet future
supply challenges and to improve drinking water quality and efficiency, in the 1970s adjustments were
made to the first Drinking Supply Act (dating from 1957). An important adjustment was the 1971
amendment that restricted operating licenses to drinking water companies with more than 100,000
customer households. A subsequent change was made in 1975 allowing provincial governments to
force companies to merge [30,31].
This policy started to bear fruit in the 1980s. Whereas in 1980 there were more than 100 drinking
water companies, by 1990 that number had almost halved. In the following years, this consolidation
process continued, although the pace was slightly slower. While the wave of mergers in the 1980s had
been driven by government policy, the mergers in the 1990s were usually supported by the drinking
water companies themselves. Efficiency improvement was now at the forefront more than it had been
in the preceding period. Significant economies of scale were envisaged, especially through the use
of IT, outsourcing and customer management. In addition, it was argued that the companies were
too small to react adequately to new technological developments in the provision of drinking water
services. Developing new water treatment technologies required considerable investments and the
drinking water companies would be too small to cover these costs themselves [32].
The desire to become bigger therefore continued and the number of drinking water companies
decreased further, even after the turn of the century. In 2007, the number of companies fell to ten, which
is the current number. Figure 1 shows the development of the number of drinking water companies
since 1980.
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Figure 1. Number of Dutch drinking water companies, 1980–2015.
During the second wave of mergers, the sector also became the subject of the liberalisation
debate that was taking place in many Western countries at the time. The debate was spurred in 1997
when a Ministry of Economic Affairs report concluded that privatisation could reduce water tariffs
by 10% [32,33]. The drinking water supply sector strongly opposed privatisation, as did the Dutch
parliament. A motion to prevent it received broad support in parliament [31]. For the drinking water
companies, however, the debate was an incentive to provide more insight into their functioning. To
counter the arguments about efficiency and other alleged benefits of privatisation, in around 1998 the
association of Dutch water companies (Vewin) started preparations for the development of a public
drinking water benchmark.
Although the benchmark was developed primarily to meet the desire for greater efficiency in
the drinking water sector [34], performance was also compared on other aspects. In addition to
financial performance, product quality and customer satisfaction, the environmental performance
of the drinking water companies was also compared. This seems an obvious thing to have done,
because one of the arguments against privatisation was that less attention would be paid to sustainable
management [31]. In the environmental performance measurement, energy use was a dominant issue.
Companies using energy that was generated with renewable sources (e.g., solar energy, geothermal
energy, biogas, hydropower, wind and renewable biomass energy) got a good score, an outcome that
encouraged many other companies to think about green energy too [31]. If that is true, it would indicate
that the benchmark may have played an important role in making the sector more sustainable. Further,
with regard to the use of renewable energy, the sector is indeed performing well: the proportion of
sustainably generated energy used by the sector was only 4% in 1997, whereas since 2012 the figure
has been 100% [35].
In addition to sustainability, progress has also been made on other benchmark themes. Blank and
Van Heezik [1] observe that drinking water quality has increased considerably since the introduction of
the benchmark. This also applies to customer satisfaction. However, it should be noted that this is not
a result of benchmarking alone: laws and other regulations have also made an important contribution
to this.
After the first benchmark (reference year 1997), a new one was performed every three years.
Detailed protocols have been developed and refined over the years for each of the four themes.
Although the benchmark is voluntary, the vast majority of companies participate in the scheme [36].
All companies participated in the 2006 benchmark, with the exception of one very small drinking
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water company. Nevertheless, the new Drinking Water Act, which came into force in 2011, requires a
mandatory benchmark [36] that is carried out by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management
(the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate) rather than by the sector itself. One of the reasons
for introducing a mandatory system was to improve the accuracy and reliability of the data and the
quality of the comparison [32]. Another reason was that the introduction of mandatory improvement
plans has given the government an instrument to promote performance improvement. Blokland and
Schwartz [32] note that the mandatory benchmark is also the main barrier to the further upscaling of
the Dutch water services sector, as benchmarking requires a minimum number of companies in order
to allow useful performance comparison. The current number of 10 drinking water companies seems
to be close to the required minimum.
4. Data
4.1. Data Description
The empirical analyses performed for this study are based on a set of time series variables of
the Dutch drinking water sector. The data are derived from a unique, interactive and user-friendly
publicly accessible database on public sector trends from 1980 to the present, which also includes
figures on productivity change. This database—Trends in the Public Sector (TiPS)—is developed by
IPSE Studies and contains information on various public sector services in the Netherlands, including
safety and justice, education, healthcare and infrastructure. Here, variables on production, costs and
the use of resources for the Dutch drinking water sector are used.
The variables describe the Dutch drinking water sector as a whole, meaning that differences in
efficiency between the individual drinking water companies are not taken into account. The data cover
the period 1979–2015. Thus, there are 37 observations. Note that we “lose” one observation in the
analysis due to the use of a production growth variable (a lagged variable). Table 1 presents the data
used in the analyses.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, variables on the Dutch drinking water industry 1979–2015.
Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Costs
Total costs (×million Euro) 1133.294 232.236 472.715 1660.224
Personnel costs (×million Euro) 270.076 0.342 204.081 353.000
Costs material supplies (×million Euro) 376.001 135.169 130.794 549.395
Capital costs (×million Euro) 487.217 137.611 137.840 848.959
Resource prices
Price personnel (index 1980 = 100) 0.413 0.155 0.224 0.712
Price material supplies (index 1980 = 100) 0.718 0.168 0.429 1.000
Prices capital inputs (index 1980 = 100) 0.037 0.011 0.013 0.057
Production
Drinking water delivery (×million m3) 1150.623 48.940 1052.400 1226.600
Number of connections (× 1000) 6445.065 1105.554 4636.186 8011.000
Three resources are distinguished: personnel, material supplies and capital inputs. The price of
personnel is computed as the personnel costs per working hour. The price of material supplies is set at
the consumer price index published by Statistics Netherlands. Finally, the price of capital inputs is
computed by dividing the capital costs by the volume of capital inputs. The volume of capital inputs is
derived from data on depreciation and investments in the drinking water industry, using the perpetual
inventory method [37]. According to this method, the actual input of capital is equal to an aggregate
of the historical flow of investments, taking into account the depreciation of capital and the price of
investment goods.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 3463 7 of 14
Production is measured by the amount of drinking water delivered and the number of connections.
Drinking water quality in the Netherlands has been high over time. Nevertheless, some measures have
been taken to improve the quality of drinking water and of the production process and the sustainability
thereof (see the discussion in Section 3). Since we do not have enough clear data on these quality
aspects, we are obliged to ignore these aspects in the analysis. Since we know from various statistics
and inspection reports that there has been a significant increase in quality in the last two decades, we
must assume that production is being undervalued and productivity is therefore underestimated.
4.2. Historical Trends
Figure 2 shows the production of drinking water in the period 1980–2015, expressed in terms of
water delivery and the number of connections.
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Figure 2. Cost and production of Dutch drinking water companies, 1980–2015 (index numbers,
1980 = 100).
Figure 2 shows that the production of drinking water has undergone a modest development. The
volume of drinking water has risen by 7% in 35 years. The growth took place almost entirely in the
1980s. Since 1992, there has been an almost constant decline. This means that less water is used per
capita in the Netherlands. The number of connections, on the other hand, has grown considerably
(i.e., by around +70%). The total costs increased by a factor of 2.8 between 1980 and 2015. Most of the
increase is attributable to material costs (growth factor of 3.8). The volatile course of the total costs is
mainly due to the capital costs, which fluctuate considerably over time.
5. Model Specification and Estimation
5.1. The Cost Function Model
Productivity changes are derived from an estimated cost function. The productivity changes are
measu e at the natio al level, taking the drinking water sy em as the unit of obser a ion. The cost
function assum s relationship between resources and services delivered. A co t function model
allows for a multiple- sources multiple-services analysis that is suitable for studying complex sectors
such a the drinking wat r indu try. From the cost function, cost share equations can be derived that
d scribe the demand for resources [38].
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A translog cost function [39] is used here, but in a hybrid form since most of the second-order
terms are excluded. The translog function is a rather flexible form that allows for varying economies of
scale, varying resource substitution and varying technical change that comes from varying production
levels, varying resource prices and from different points in time. However, since the number of
parameters would be too large for our dataset, which consists of 37 observations (note: there is one
lagged variable), we have to restrict the flexibility to some extent by using a hybrid form. Due to a lack
of variation in the output variables, second-order terms including output variables are excluded.
The cost equation also includes a first-order lag operator representing the dynamics of the system.
A production change usually does not immediately lead to an equivalent change in cost, as the existing
capacity will initially allow for an extension of production. Hiring staff and (especially) increasing
capital inputs will lag behind. In this case, the estimated effects will therefore describe short-term
reactions rather than long-term relationships. However, the production change may also cause a more
sustainable change due to innovative behaviour. This is known as Verdoorn’s law [40,41]. In order to
capture this effect, an additional term is added to the model to reflect production growth. In the case of
the drinking water industry, a sudden increase in production may be interpreted as an increase in the
occupancy rate of the drinking water industry capacity. The expected sign of this variable is negative.
The model also includes a measure for average scale, namely total production divided by the
number of institutions. Since scale effects can be negative, absent or positive, no clear hypothesis can
be formulated beforehand. Because policy is aimed at increasing productivity through consolidation,
it is interesting to test the hypothesis that the corresponding estimate is negative (i.e., increasing scale
leads to lower costs).
The time trend is derived from two splines. We have divided the time span into two sub-periods
allowing for different time trends in the sub-periods. This enables us to test whether annual productivity
growth differs between the periods before and after the introduction of the benchmark in 1997.
In general, econometric frameworks also include an error term reflecting specification errors
and measurement errors. The possible specification errors also include some incidental changes
in productivity (e.g., due to a change in legislation). Whereas in regular multivariate regression
analysis, residuals are interpreted just as a stochastic component depending on measurement errors
and misspecifications of the model, in this case they may reveal slightly more than a stochastic outcome.
In particular, due to applying the autocorrelated regression method, the corrected residuals show a
non-normal pattern and reveal incidental shocks that may be interpreted as an incidental change in
productivity. We therefore also present these uncorrected residuals. This leads to the following cost
function model:



































jn(t− T0) ln(wn) + u
(1)
where:
ym = production service m (m = 1, . . . , M);
∆ln(ym) = relative change in production service m (m = 1, . . . , M);
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wn = resource price n (n = 1, . . . , N);
t = time;
Tp = last year of period p;
T0 = first year of analysis;
u = error term.





divides the period of analysis into different time periods, in which different
speeds of technical change may occur. They can be regarded as a set of splines, which allows for more
erratic patterns than in the case of specifications with linear, square or cubic terms. We have chosen to
fix the cut-off points at 1997.
The corresponding cost share equations can be derived by using Shephard’s lemma and are
given by:






jn(t− T0) + un n = 1 . . .N (2)
where:
Sn = cost share of resource n
For the parameters of resource prices there is a homogeneity restriction (of degree 1). This means




cn = 1 ;
N∑
n




The cost function must be non-decreasing in resource prices (a price increase cannot lead to a
cost decrease). The cost function is non-decreasing if all predicted cost shares based on the estimated
parameters are positive. The cost function also must be concave in resource prices (a 1% increase of an
input price does not increase cost by more than 1% times the cost share of that resource). As usual,
these requirements are examined after the estimation. The concavity is checked by testing whether the
price elasticities of demand are negative (a price increase leads to a decrease in the quantity demanded).











ηn = elasticity of demand for input n.
Further, we impose constant returns to scale. This seems to be a reasonable assumption when
working at a national level. Note that this is not a contradiction with the possibility of the existence of
possible scale effects at the institution level, which will be reflected in the scale variable. Here, it means




As mentioned, productivity can be derived from the cost function. We define productivity as the
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For f (Y) we take the geometric mean of the distinct outputs, whereas the weights depend on the
shares of output values in a certain base year. Since output prices are lacking here, the output values
are based on the costs that are involved in producing this output. Because of the functional form of the
cost function, these output value shares coincide with the bm parameters.
For the aggregated output indicator g(X) we take actual costs deflated for price increases. The
applied deflator here is also a geometric mean of input prices, where weights are based on cost shares
in a certain base year. In this case the cost shares coincide with the cn parameters.












With Equation (4) we have a one-to-one correspondence between the productivity measure
and the cost function. By estimating the parameters of the cost function, we can also calculate the
productivity measure.
5.2. Estimation Method
The cost function model includes a large number of parameters, especially if all the various
resources and services are included. In particular, in a time series (as is the case here), estimating a
large number of parameters leads to econometric problems. This is because, firstly, time series usually
have relatively few observations, leading to a limited number of degrees of freedom. Secondly, most
time series are non-stationary, implying that the use of ordinary least squares would lead to spurious
correlation. The strong correlation between observations would also lead to multicollinearity, yielding
non-efficient estimators. The strong coherence between explanatory variables makes it impossible to
attribute the variation in the endogenous variable to individual explanatory variables.
Econometrics offers several solutions to this problem. The simplest and most widely used one is to
allow for autocorrelation by applying an autoregressive transformation to all the variables in the model.
This means that the estimation deals with changes in variables rather than the levels themselves. Thus
each variable f in the model is transformed as follows: f-ρf (−1). The parameter ρ is also estimated. The
trend and the corresponding correlation are then eliminated from the model. Multicollinearity can
only be avoided by including additional information, such as fixing certain parameters beforehand,
based on values found in earlier research, or by imposing theoretical restrictions.
Since the cost function model consists of a system of equations with parameter
restrictions between equations, the method of nonlinear least squares is adopted, based on the
Davidon–Fletcher–Powell algorithm.
6. Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the estimates, standard errors and t-values of the parameters (for each of
the equations).
In Table 2 the results of the model neatly represent the costs of the drinking water industry, given
that a large majority of parameters are statistically significant at the 5% level. Additional statistical
tests indicate that the hypothesis that the model does not satisfy the concavity requirement is rejected.
All elasticity parameters are not significantly different from zero, even at the 10% level. Monotonicity
of input prices is also met: all input price parameters are positive. The explained variances of costs
and cost shares are very high (due to the autocorrelation parameter).
One very interesting estimated effect concerns the production change variable (b0 = −0.446), which
indicates that production change itself leads to reduced costs (and thus increased productivity) due to
the lagged responses of drinking water firms to the permanently growing services. Since drinking
water production, and in particular the number of connections, has been growing consistently over
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the years, this variable explains the general increase in overall productivity. This is the so-called
Verdoorn effect.
Table 2. Estimates cost function model (1980–2015).
Variable Parameter Estimate St. Error T-Value
Constant A1 −0.242 0.118 −2.052
Water supply (m3) B1 0.350 0.097 3.609
Number of connections B2 0.650 0.097 6.710
Price of personnel C1 0.252 0.028 9.048
Price of material supplies C2 0.384 0.030 12.758
Price of capital C3 0.364 0.014 26.111
Price of personnel × Price of personnel C11 0.152 0.023 6.582
Price of personnel × Price of material supplies C12 −0.062 0.023 −2.663
Price of personnel × price of capital C13 −0.090 0.005 −18.288
Price of material supplies × price of material supplies C22 0.209 0.024 8.793
Price of material supplies × price of capital C23 −0.148 0.005 −30.771
Price of capital × price of capital C33 0.238 0.004 54.923
Time trend 1980–1997 AA1 0.007 0.005 1.500
Time trend 1998–2015 AA2 −0.006 0.003 −2.376
Time trend × price of personnel J11 −0.002 0.001 −2.060
Time trend × price of material supplies J12 0.000 0.001 0.196
Time trend × price of capital J13 0.002 0.000 3.836
Autocorrelation coefficient RO 0.860 0.036 24.213
Verdoorn’s coefficient B0 −0.446 0.126 −3.545
Economies of scale coefficient BEOS −0.020 0.018 −1.095
Price changes have not led to substitution between the inputs as reflected by the elasticities of
substitution. The estimates of the price coefficients indicate that the inputs are not substitutes: all
elasticities of substitution are not significantly different from zero (even at the 10% level).
Nevertheless, we observe some substitution in time. The estimates of the technological change
parameters (j11 < 0, j12 = 0, j13 > 0) indicate that through time personnel have been replaced by capital
inputs. Thus, technical change has been input biased rather than Hicksian neutral. On average, the
share of capital inputs increased by 0.2% point annually at the expense of the share of personnel.
The estimates of technical change differ substantially between the first time period (year ≤ 1997)
and the second time period (year > 1997). The difference between the corresponding parameters equals
1.3% (0.7% and −0.6%) and is statistically significant (t-value = 3.262). This outcome indicates that
since the introduction of the benchmark in 1997, annual productivity growth has increased by 1.3% on
average. To illustrate this outcome, Figure 3 presents the total factor productivity.
According to Figure 3, productivity is more or less stable in the pre-benchmark period. The
year 1998 obviously is a turning point. From then on, productivity growths substantially. The figure
also indicates that we might be witnessing another turning point in the most recent years. Since
2013, productivity growth has stagnated. Unfortunately, this period is too short to conclude that the
benchmarking has become ineffective. However, other studies do indicate a reduced benchmark effect
in the Dutch drinking water sector in recent years [36].
The scale parameter (BEOS) is very small and not significantly different from zero, implying that
the hypothesis that economies of scale do not prevail, could not be rejected (at either the 5% or the 10%
level). This does not imply that economies of scale do not exist in this industry. At a micro level, there
is much more variation between drinking water companies, and economies/diseconomies of scale
could be identified for small or large firms. At a macro level, we are not able to establish economies of
scale due to a lack of variation in the scale variable (aggregation bias).
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Figure 3. Total factor productivity of the drinking water industry, 1980–2015 (index numbers 1980 = 100).
7. Concluding Remarks
Since 1980, the Dutch drinking water industry has undergone two major policy reforms:
consolidation of the industry by stimulating mergers and the introduction of yardstick competition by
applying benchmarks. Both measures were part of large-scale policy reforms in the network industries
aimed at improving their performance.
This paper addresses the question whether these two instruments have improved productivity.
Two research questions are raised:
• What is the productivity change in the Dutch drinking water sector in the past four decades?
• Has productivity change been influenced by government policy, in particular by industry
consolidation and yardstick competition?
Industry consolidation has taken place over a long period of time. The number of drinking water
firms declined from 102 in 1980 to 10 in 2007 (and has remained stable since then). Yardstick competition
was introduced in 1997 on a voluntary basis. Since 2011, the benchmark has been mandatory due
to legislation (the new Drinking Water Act). The effects of both measures are empirically tested in
this paper.
Productivity changes are derived from an estimated cost function. The productivity changes
are measured at the national level, taking the drinking water industry as the unit of observation.
Estimation is conducted on the basis of time series data in the period 1980–2015.
The estimation shows that total factor productivity was rather stable in the period 1980–1997.
Since 1998, annual productivity growth has been substantial (about 0.6% on average). There was
an obvious break point in 1998, providing clear evidence that the introduction of the benchmark
instrument has positively affected productivity change. Moreover, there are various indications that
benchmarking has also contributed to improving quality and sustainability. However, there are also
indications that the effect has been diminishing in the most recent years. The length of this period is
too short to provide clear evidence for the assertion that the benchmark instrument has lost its effect
but it does suggest that a threshold value is being reached and further productivity gains can only
be made through high investments and innovation. Further research and more recent data added to
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the time series might shed light on the question if indeed a threshold has been reached; to stimulate
innovation new deviant indicators might be needed.
We could not find any empirical evidence for the hypothesis that consolidation of the industry
has improved productivity. From literature we know that economies of scale prevail for small firms,
but their weight in the total drinking water supply at a national level is so modest that no effect could
be established.
While no evidence has been found for a positive impact of consolidation on productivity, there
are indications of the opposite effect of the ever-increasing mergers. The literature indicates that for
an effective benchmarking, a minimum number of organizations is required. A sharp decrease in
the number of participating organizations will considerably reduce the productivity incentives of the
instrument. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that the scale of organizations can become so large that
scale disadvantages arise, with negative productivity effects as a result. It looks very likely that both
situations apply to the current Dutch drinking water companies.
Although small drinking water companies in other countries may still be able to become more
productive through scaling up, developments in the Dutch drinking water sector demonstrate that
consolidation is limited by boundaries.
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